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Comments
THE SALE BY WEIGHT, COUNT, OR MEASURE
Articles 2458 and 2459 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
deal with goods, produce, and other objects. The French transla-
tion uses the word marchandises,' a word which more properly
expresses the purpose of the redactors to exclude property that
is immovable by nature from the operation of these articles. Ac-
cordingly, this discussion is limited to a treatment of the sale of
movable property by weight, count, or measure.
2
1. 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of
Louisiana (1942) 1354-1355.
2. For a treatment of the sale of immovable property by measure see
Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 609.
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Generally speaking, Article 24583 covers two possible situa-
tions:
1. The case where all of a mass of goods is sold at a price to
be determined by weighing, counting, or measuring the entire
mass.
Example: A sells B all the wheat in A's granary for a price
of $1.00 a bushel. The lack of certainty of the price hinders the
perfection of the sale. Nevertheless, some authorities have argued
that this situation is in reality a lump sale.4
2. The case where a certain number of units are sold from a
limited mass of objects. The parties are agreed upon the price
and the amount; but a weighing, counting, or measuring is neces-
sary to separate, designate, or individualize the goods sold.
Example: A sells B ten bushels of the wheat that is in A's
granary for ten dollars. The uncertainty of the object sold hin-
ders the consummation of the sale. Until the ten bushels have
been separated from the mass, the parties do not know which
ten bushels have been sold.
On the other hand, if the weighing, counting, or measuring
is not necessary in order to determine either the pri~e of the thing
sold, then the sale will be ruled by Article 2459. Between the
parties the sale will be complete immediately.
Example: A sells B all the wine in A's wine cellar for $100.
The sale is perfect and both the title and the risks then pass to
the buyer.
The problems arising from these distinctions have bothered
courts and legal scholars since the days of Roman law.
ROMAN LAW
In Roman law the contract of sale-emptio venditio-
amounted to a promise by one person to transfer a thing in return
for the promise of another person to pay a determined price. The
buyer became owner of the thing sold only upon the delivery
or transfer of possession-known as the traditio.5 The contract
3. Art. 2458, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When goods, produce, or other ob-
jects, are not sold in a lump, but by weight, by tale, or by measure, the sale
is not perfect, inasmuch as the things so sold are at the risk of the seller,
until they be weighed, counted or measured; but the buyer may require either
the delivery of them or damages, if there be any, in case of non-execution of
the contract."
4. See discussion, p. 297, infra.
5. Buckland, A Manual'of Roman Private Law (1939) 135-137, § 51; Moyle,
The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law (1892) 110. In early Roman law, a
transfer of res mancipi-land, slaves, beasts of burden, and servitudes re-
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was consensual, requiring no particular form. Ordinarily risks
would be on the owner of the thing sold-res petit domino-but
where specific goods were sold for a determined price the risks
fell on the buyer from the time the obligation was perfected. The
perfection of the contract gave a right of damages to the buyer
if the seller refused to perform; it transferred the risks to the
buyer, but it did not transfer title.6 For the sale to be perfect
(perfecta), it was not sufficient that the ordinary elements of an
obligation be present. The price must be fixed; the goods must be
specifically determined; the contract must not be subject to a sus-
pensive condition or the reservation of a right of test. According-
ly a sale would not be considered perfect so long as a weighing,
counting, or measuring was necessary to determine either the
price to be paid or the specific thing sold. The obligation would
be binding between the parties, but the risks would remain on
the seller until the weighing, counting, or measuring had occurred
to remedy the defect of uncertainty of the thing sold.8 If a flock
of sheep were sold at a price per head, the sale would not be
perfected until the price had been determined by counting the
sheep.9 Likewise, if a hundred measures of wine were sold from
a wine cellar, the risk would remain on the seller until the par-
ticular one hundred measures were separated from the remainder
of the wine; otherwise the sale would be imperfect for lack of
certainty of the thing sold.10 However, if the loss occurred due to
the lack of reasonable care by the seller even after the contract
had been perfected, the seller would have to bear the loss."
In pre-codal French law, the Roman law provision that title
did not pass until delivery retained its efficacy," although this
requisite was often circumvented by inserting a clause in the act
of sale declaring that the object had been delivered, or appointing
the seller agent to hold the goods for the buyer."1 Without such
quired a formal ceremony known as mancipatio. Jolowicz, Historical Intro-
duction to the Study of Roman Law (1932) 139.
6. 1.3.23.3; Buckland, op. cit. supra note 5, at 282, § 109; Moyle, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 77. But the parties could validly agree that the risk would
remain on the seller until delivery, D.18.1.35.4; D.18.6.1.pr. See Moyle, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 90.
7. Buckland, op. cit. supra note 5, at 283, § 109; Moyle, op. cit. supra note
5, at 77-86.
8. Moyle, op. cit. supra note 5, at 83-85.
9. D.18.1.35.6.
10. D.18.1.35.7.
11. Moyle, op. cit. supra note 5, at 90. 1.3.23.3; D.18.6.12; D.19.1.36.
12. 1 Pothier, Treatises on Contracts (Cushing transl. 1839) 200-201.
13. Id. at 197-198. See 1 Guillouard, Trait~s de la Vente & de l'Echange (2
ed. 1890) 90, no 77; 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Fran-
19431
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fictional delivery the buyer would be limited to a personal action
for damages for failure of the seller to deliver the goods. 4 The
feigned delivery enabled the purchaser to seize the property from
the seller or seizing creditors'5 or even from third parties in good
faith. However, this use of feigned delivery served no purpose in
the case of a sale by weight, count, or measure. If the sale was
not perfected by agreement on the price and the thing, the im-
perfect contract of sale couldnot be given effect even by an actual
delivery. According to Pothier, when specific goods were sold, the
risks were on the purchaser in case the goods were destroyed
without fault on the part of the seller from the moment the sale
was perfected and even before delivery.0 A sale by weight, count,
or measure was an imperfect sale until the weighing, counting, or
measuring both in the case where a certain number of units was
to be taken from a designated mass and also where an entire mass
was sold at a price per unit, 17 the imperfection of the sale existed,
said Pothier, because of the uncertainty of the thing sold on the
one hand and because of the uncertainty of the price on the other.
The risks remained on the seller and the buyer could not enforce
the contract against third parties. Nevertheless certain obliga-
tions resulted even from an imperfect contract of sale. The buyer
had a right of action against the seller for delivery of the thing,
or for damages, and the seller was entitled to the price after
offering delivery.'
The French Civil Code contains Article 1585, which is iden-
tical with Article 2458 of the Louisiana Civil Code. All French
commentators agree that this article includes the sale of a certain
gais (1932) 185, no 175, n. 2. For a discussion of this subject, see Comment
(1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REviw 629, 630.
14. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 12, at 200-202, nos 319-321.
15. Id. at 202-204, no 322.
16. Id. at 187-190, no 308: "It is true that, before the measuring, weighing,
or counting, and at the instant of the contract, the engagements which result
from it exist. The buyer is then entitled to an action against the seller for
the delivery of the thing, and the seller is entitled to an action against the
buyer, for a recovery of the price, upon offering to deliver it."
17. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 12, at 191, no 309: "But though the en-
gagement of the seller subsists from that time (of the agreement), it may be
truly said that it is not yet perfect, in this respect, that as yet it is only (a
sale] of an object which is indeterminate, and which can be determined only
by the measuring, weighing, or counting. For this reason, until the thing is
measured, weighed, or counted, it does not become at the risk of the buyer;
for the risk cannot fall but upon some determinate thing.
"This rule holds . . . also ... when the sale is of the entire quantity con-
• tained in a magazine or granary, provided it is made at the rate of so much
the measure, etc.
"The sale, in this case, is not considered as perfect . . .until It Is meas-
ured or weighed; for, until that time, non apparet quantum venierit."
18. Id. at 191, no 309.
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number of units to be taken from a designated mass at so much
per measure,19 since the thing sold is not determined until it has
been segregated from the mass by means of a weighing, counting,
or measuring.
However, the French commentators are almost evenly di-
vided in regard to a sale of an entire mass at a price to be deter-
mined by weighing, counting, or measuring. A substantial num-
ber of commentators argue that this is a lump sale20 which is
complete before the weighing, counting, or measuring, and that
Article 1585 contemplates only the situation where the thing sold
is not determined until it is separated from a larger mass. It is the
contention of this group that the price can be estimated with
relative ease and that hardship to the buyer can be averted by
placing upon the seller the burden of establishing the amount of
goods sold in cases where the goods are destroyed. This view
conforms to the few terse remarks on this subject made by the
redactors of the French Civil Code. 21
A majority of French commentators take the position that
it is also a sale by weight, count, or measure when an entire mass
is sold at a price per unit, since the price is not known until the
weighing, counting, or measuring. 2 This view finds support in
' 19. Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 Theorique et Pratique de Droit Civil Des
Obligations (3 ed. 1906) 188, no 147.
20. 5 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil FranQais (5 ed. 1907) 20-21, §
349; 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 13, at 42-44, no 30; 10 Planiol et Ripert,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 330-331, no 299.
21. 14 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Pr~paratoires du Code Civil
(1836) 21: (Translation) "M. Treilhard says that the article as it is worded
is not perhaps perfectly exact; for, if one sells all that which is found in his
warehouse for so much per measure, there remains uncertainty only on the
quantity; the thing and the price are determined.
"The Consul Cambacrs thinks that this opinion is susceptible of objec-
tions. In a sale of ten hogsheads of wheat, for example, the thing is at the
risk of the buyer only after the measuring; this is the case that the article
provides and decides.
"M. Treilhard agrees that this opinion is correct but he thinks that it
can be reconciled with his own.
"If one buys all of the goods deposited in a warehouse, the sale is perfect
as soon as the price is agreed.
"If on the contrary one buys a certain quantity of goods not in lump, but
by measure, as in the hypothesis presented by the Consul, the sale is per-
fected only after the goods have been measured and delivered.
"The Consul Cambac6r~s shares this opinion; but the important thing,
he says, is that the case is not submitted to the disposition of article 2 (1583)
which, following the maxim res petit domino, puts the thing at the risk of
the buyer from the moment that the sale is perfect."
22. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, Trait6 Thtorique et Pratique de
Droit Civil, De la Vente et de l'Rchange (3 ed. 1908) 147-148, no 148; 7 De-
mante et Colmet de Santerre, Cours Analytique de Code Civil (2 ed. 1887)8-9,
bis II; 16 Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais (3 ed. 1834) 112-117, no 88; 10
Rue, Commentaire Th6orique & Pratique du Code Civil (1897) 31-33, no 17; 24
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the writings of Pothier2 3 and also in the Roman law background. 24
The decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court have consistently
adhered to this latter view.25
Sale of a Fractional Part
If a fractional part, such as a third or a fourth of the goods
located at a particular place, is sold for a lump price, there is no
doubt that this would be treated as a lump sale with the buyer
becoming an owner in indivision .2  If the fractional part is sold
for a price per unit, the French commentators, although several
of them do not discuss the point, would probably be divided along
the same lines as in the case where an entire mass is sold at a
price to be determined by weighing, counting, or measuring.27
The same question of uncertainty of the price arises and the
solution to the problem will usually depend upon the significance
to the particular authority of this degree of uncertainty. Guil-
louard, however, changes sides on this point and says that the
result would be different from that where an entirety is sold at a
price per unit. According to Guillouard, 2 the purchaser has con-
sented to become an owner before the partition and it should
be presumed that he is willing to undertake the risk of the part
purchased. Although this point has not been decided in Louisi-
ana, it seems reasonable to suppose that since the Louisiana de-
cisions are in harmony with the view of the commentators who
consider a sale of a totality at a price per unit to be a sale by
weight, count, or measure,'2 Louisiana will probably treat such
a fractional sale as a sale by weight, count, or measure.
Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Franeais (1877) 141-146, no 139; 6 Marcad6,
Explication Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1875) 155; 1 Troplong,
Droit Civil Expliqu6, 1 De la Vente (5 ed. 1856) 89-98, nos 83-88.
23. See note 18, supra.
24. See note 9, supra.
25. Lambeth v. Wells, 12 Rob. 51 (La. 1845); Larue & Prevost v. Rugely,
10 La. Ann. 242 (1855); Goodwin v. Pritchard, 10 La. Ann. 249 (1855); Rhea v.
Otto, 19 La. Ann. 123 (1867); Peterkin v. Martin, 30 La. Ann. 894 (1878); Kohler
v. Ruth Construction Co., 168 La. 827, 123 So. 588 (1929). See Duncan v. George
Arnold Holt & Co., 21 La. Ann. 235 (1869). But see Penick & Ford v. Wagues-
pack & Haydel, 148 La. 39, 86 So. 605 (1920).
26. See for example, 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 22, at
154-155, no 153; 7 Demante et Crolmet de Santerre, op. cit. supra note 22, at 12,
no 7; 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 20, at 42-44, no 30; 10 Planiol et Ripert,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 331, no 299.
27. The position of those who would consider such a sale to be made in
lump is represented by 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 20, at 330-331,
no 299. Representative of commentators considering the situation a sale by
weight, count, or measure are 16 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 22, at 114, no
88; 1 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 22, at 99, no 90.
28. 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 20, at 45-46, no 32.
29. See supra note 25.
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Effects of a Sale by Weight, Count, or Measure
Risks have always passed to the buyer at the time the goods
are weighed, counted, or measured.3 0 It seems probable, how-
ever, that even this rule can be modified by express agreement
of the parties.31 By the adoption of Article 1583 of the French
Civil Code, from which Article 245632 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
was derived, title was made to pass, as between the parties by
mere agreement on the price and the thing rather than at the
time of delivery. This departure from Roman law was designed
to cause both title and risks to be transferred at the time when
the sale was "perfected" rather than at the time of delivery.
Unfortunately the French decisions and French commentators
have not been in complete harmony on this point.
In the case where a certain number of units are sold to be
taken from a determined mass, an early decision of the Court of
Cassation held that since a sale by weight, count, or measure was
not perfect en ce sens13 that the goods were at the risk of the
seller until the weighing, counting, or measuring, that it was
complete in all other respects.34 Nevertheless the French com-
mentators now agree almost unanimously that title is not trans-
ferred until the weighing, counting, or measuring on the ground
that the thing sold is not determined until it is separated from
the mass by means of a weighing, counting, or measuring.3 5 This
view was taken by the redactors of the French Civil Code.30
30. See supra notes 9, 10, and 18.
31. See supra note 6. See also cases in which custom has controlled in
determining the intentions of the parties, such as 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 333, no 300.
32. Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The sale is considered to be perfect
between the parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser
with regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object
and for the price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor
the price paid."
33. Where Art. 2458 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 uses the word
"inasmuch" the French translation and the same passage of the French
Civil Code uses the words en ce sens, which might more literally be trans-
lated to mean "in this sense."
34. 11 nov. 1812, Sirey 1813.1.52. In accord with this opinion is 16 Duran-
ton, op. cit. supra note 22, at 119-121, no 92. The case was referred to without
contradiction in 14 Merlin, R6pertoire Universel et Raisonnd de Jurispru-
dence (4 ed. 1815) 526, vo Vente § 4.
35. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 20, at 20-21, § 349; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 22, at 150-152, no 150; 1 Guillouard, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 46, no 33; 10 Huc, op. cit. supra note 22, at 33, no 18; 6
Marcadd, op. cit. supra note 22, at 157-159; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 331-332, no 300; 5 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 22, at 89-90, nos
83-86.
36. 14 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 21, at 21, 85, 153, 182, 183.
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Undoubtedly this is the correct position and fortunately it seems
to have been recognized in Louisiana.3 7
In the case where an entire mass of objects is sold at a price
to be determined by weighing, counting, or measuring, the ques-
tion of passage of title becomes more perplexing. This question
is not considered by the group of French commentators 8 who
view this situation as a lump sale. Of the commentators who
consider this case a sale by weight, count, or measure, the ma-
jority conclude that the sale is imperfect until the weighing,
counting, or measuring and that title like risks, passes only when
the sale has been perfected by the weighing, counting, or measur-
ing." This position was adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Lambeth v. Wells.40 In that case several bales of cotton were
to be taken in partial satisfaction of a debt. The price of the
cotton was to be determined by weight. After the cotton had
been delivered to the buyer and before it was weighed the cotton
was seized by a creditor of the seller. The court held that the
transfer of the title had never been consummated because the
cotton had never been weighed and therefore the creditors of the
seller could seize the cotton in the hands of the buyer. In cases
where cotton was sold by the pound and the weighing and de-
livery took place simultaneously, the Louisiana Supreme Court
consistently took the view that title passed at the time of this
transaction rather than at the time of the contract. 41 Some dicta
is to be found in these cases to the effect that title passes at the
time of the delivery,42 but in such cases the weighing and delivery
was simultaneous.
Laurent 43 and Colmet de Santerre44 disagree with that solu-
tion. They contend that since the thing sold is individualized
and determined, title should pass immediately upon the consent
of the parties although the risks would remain on the seller
until the price is ascertained by weighing, counting, or measur-
37. See Abat & Cushman v. Atkinson, 21 La. Ann. 414 (1869).
38. See authorities cited supra note 20.
39. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 22, at 150-152, no 150; 10
Huc, op. cit. supra note 22, at 33, no 18; 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 22, at
157-159; 1 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 22, at 89-98, nos 83-88.
40. 12 Rob. 51 (La. 1845).
41. Larue & Prevost v. Rugely, 10 La. Ann. 242 (1855); Rhea v. Otto, 19
La. Ann. 123 (1867); Paton v. Newman, 51 La. Ann. 1428, 26 So. 576 (1899).
42. See, for example, Larue & Prevost v. Rugely, 10 La. Ann. 242, 243
(1855).
43. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 22, at 143, no 139.
44. 7 Demante et Colmet de Santerre, op. cit. supra note 22, at 8-9, no 7,
bWs II.
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ing.45 The early Louisiana case of Shuff v. Morgan41 supports
disregarded and it is definitely out of line with the many later
that position; however, that case seems to have been generally
decisions of the Louisiana courts.
47
Although the contract may never be consummated by a
weighing, counting, or measuring, it is nevertheless binding.
48
If the buyer refuses to accept the goods the seller is entitled to
damages, usually the difference between the contract price and
the price which the seller was later able to obtain for the same
merchandise. If the seller refuses to perform the buyer is en-
titled to compel specific performance or obtain damages, usually
the latter, because the contract is generally breached actively by
the seller transferring the same goods to another buyer. Al-
though the courts will not estimate the amount of goods in a mass
in order to determine the price after the goods have been de-
stroyed, they should be less reluctant to undertake the task in
the case of wilful and active breach of the contract, since the
party who fails to perform is in bad faith.
The case of Penick and Ford v. Waguespack & HaydelJ4 pre-
sented to the Louisiana Supreme Court an opportunity to apply
the latter principle. In that case a crop of molasses was sold at a
price per gallon and the seller was sued for damages after he
had disposed of part of the crop to a second buyer. The court
properly awarded damages, but did so by considering the contract
a completed sale. Chief Justice O'Niell in his dissenting opinion"
correctly viewed the contract as an imperfect sale by weight,
count, or measure, but apparently overlooked the fact that under
45. Ibid.
46. 9 Mart. (O.S.) 592 (La. 1821).
47. See cases cited supra notes 25, 40, 41.
48. On this point there-is no difference of opinion among the French com-
mentators. Illustrative of the French view is 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 152, no 151: "One sees in summary that when a sale is made
by weight, count, or measure, it is not perfect either in point of view of
transport of risks, or even in point of view of transfer of ownership, until
the goods have been weighed, counted, or measured.
"But from all other points of view, the contract is perfect. It creates
reciprocal obligations upon both parties; the buyer can demand the deliver-
ance of the things sold and has a right to damages if the seller does not
execute his agreement (art. 1585); in the inverse sense, although the law
does not say it, the vendor can offer the delivery to the buyer, compel him
to do it or let him do the weighing, the counting, or the measuring, and re-
quire of him the payment of the price."
To the same effect see 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 20, at 21-22, §
349; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 20, at 331, no 300; 1 Troplong, op.
cit. supra note 22, at 89-90, no 84. See also note 17, supra.
49. 148 La. 39, 86 So. 605 (1920).
50. 86 So. at 608 et seq.
1943]
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the express terms of Article 2458,51 the buyer is entitled to dam-
ages when the seller breaks such a contract although the goods
have never been weighed, counted, or measured. However, Jus-
tice O'Niell's dissent might be sustained on some of the other
grounds upon which he relied.2
Total Destruction
According to the majority of French authorities, the Code
makes no distinction between partial and total destruction in
dealing with a sale by weight, count, or measure. Hence partial
and total destruction are to be treated alike and the loss falls
entirely upon the seller until after the weighing, counting, or
measuring." No one quarrels with the result in the case where
an entire mass is sold at a price to be determined by weight,
count, or measure. However, in the case where a certain number
of units sold are to be taken from a limited mass, a few com-
mentators54 hold to the view that in the case of total destruction,
the buyer should bear his share of the loss. They argue that this
is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the general principles
of total destruction. Since performance by the seller has become
impossible, he is excused from his obligation, but not so with
the buyer who remains capable of discharging his obligation to
pay the price.55 This minority view sems to have been codified
in Louisiana law by Article 191611 of the Louisiana Civil Code:
"... when the object of the contract, although indeterminate
in itself, makes part of a whole that is determinate and cer-
tain and the whole ... is lost or destroyed by inevitable acci-
dent before delivery, the loss will fall on the creditor of the
thing sold. A sale of ten bales, of the hundred bales of cotton
in a particular store, is an example of this rule; and if all the
51. La. Civil Code of 1870.
52. Justice O'Niell argued that the sale was subject to a suspensive con-
dition and further that it was impossible for the seller to store the molasses
on his premises beyond the date at which the buyer failed to send for the
molasses.
53. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 22, at 149-150, no 149; 16
Duranton, op. cit. supra note 22, at 116-117, no 88; 10 Hue, op. cit. supra note
22, at 30, no 16; 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 22, at 143, no 139; 10 Planiol et
Ripert, op. cit. supra note 13, at 332, no 300.
54. 7 Demante et Colmet de Santerre, op. cit. supra note 22, at 11-12, no
7, bis IV; 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 13, at 46-47, no 33.
55. The principle that the seller is relieved of his obligation due to the
impossibility of performance, after total destruction of the goods to be sold,
has been severely criticized at common law. See 1 Williston, The Law Gov-
erning Sales of Goods (2 ed. 1924) 301-303, § 162.
56. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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cotton be destroyed by fire, the accident will discharge the
seller from the obligation of delivering it."
The words "the loss will fall on the creditor of the thing
sold" clearly settle the question that the buyer must sustain the
loss of the part of the thing sold. Reference to the probable
source of Article 1916,7 might support an argument that even this
article did not contemplate the sale by-weight, count, or measure,
but that it envisaged a situation where a selection or a choice of
a certain one or two things that might vary in value was in-
volved as distinguished from a sale of fungible or absolutely
homogeneous merchandise. 8 However, regardless of the intended
meaning of the legal philosophers from whose minds the article
was probably derived, the present form of Article 1916 seems
quite clearly to cover the type of sale by weight, count, or mea-
sure, where a certain number of units are sold from a designated
mass. Given this interpretation, the article stands as a reasonable
modification of the arbitrary rule. When both parties have agreed
upon the sale of goods to be taken from a certain mass, the price
is known because the amount to be sold is known. Although the
goods have never been separated, there can be no doubt that when
57. Ibid. See 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, loc. cit. supra note 1, for redac-
tors at close of section. Due to the close similarity of 4 Toullier, Le Droit
Civil Frangais (derniere ed. 1833) 190, H§ 444, 445, to Articles 1915 and 1916 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, together with the fact that Toullier is cred-
ited as the source of a great number of the Louisiana Civil Code articles in
the section dealing with obligations, has led the author of this comment to
the conclusion that Articles 1915 and 1916 were derived from an earlier edi-
tion of Toullier.
58. 4 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 57, at 190, § 445. This can be translated
as follows: "If yet the object of the obligation, although indeterminate by
itself, makes part of a determined quantity of certain things, the obligation
could be extinguished by the complete extinction of all things. I have prom-
ised you two casks of wine which are in a certain one of my cellars, or in my
cellar, if I have only one. All these wines perish by a fire or fortuitous event;
my obligation is extinguished. See Pothier, no 623; as in alternative obliga-
tions, the debtor is liberated if both the things comprised in the alternative
perish (1193)."
Then at page 192, § 448, Toullier says: "It is still necessary to distinguish
the different kinds of sales; for when the things are sold by weight, count, or
measure, the sale is not perfect, in the sense that the things sold are at the
risk of the seller until they have been weighed, counted, or measured (1585).
"But it seems that it is not necessary to extend this disposition beyond its
precise case, and that it has no other object than to cast the risks and the
loss of the things sold on the seller, until they have been weighed or meas-
ured. If, by later events, things come to the point where the contract cannot
take place, for example, if the two parties, or one of them dies or becomes
insane, the contract does not subsist the less in favor of their heirs or against
them. This is the result of the final disposition of the same article, which
gives to the buyer the faculty of demanding the execution of the contract."
The same apparent inconsistency is to be found by comparing 1 Pothier,
A Treatise on the Law of Obligations (Evans Transl. 3 Am. ed. 1853) 480, 481,
no 623, with 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 12, at 190 et seq., no 309.
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the entire mass is destroyed, the goods intended for the purchaser
perishes. The buyer should not be able to escape liability merely
because the goods had never been separated.
Article 1916 should be liberally construed to give full effect
to its purpose. For example, the article speaks of the thing sold
being part of a thing that is determinate and certain. If A sells
B 200 bushels of the corn that is in A's granary and the entire
amount is destroyed by fire, is it necessary that the amount of
corn in A's granary be precisely known or would it be sufficient
that A could establish that there were more than 200 bushels in
the granary before the fire? If Article 1916 were strictly con-
strued it would be inapplicable here since the wheat in the gra-
nary was never "determinate and certain." Article 2458 would
govern and the entire loss would be on the seller. On the other
hand, if the spirit of Article 1916 is applied it would be sufficient
to prove that the granary contained more than two hundred
bushels. It is submitted that for the purpose of Article 1916, so
long as there is a larger amount from which a smaller amount is
to be taken, the larger amount should be considered determinate
and certain if it were sufficiently determinate and certain to be
the object of a lump sale.
The same considerations would come into play in another
situation. Suppose A sells B two hundred bushels of corn at one
dollar per bushel to be taken from the one thousand bushels of
corn in A's granary. If the granary then burns and all but twen-
ty-five bushels of corn are destroyed, is the buyer liable for the
one hundred seventy-five bushels that he has agreed to buy that
must have perished in the fire? Article 1916 speaks of total loss.
If Article 1916 is not applicable then once again Article 2458 will
cause the entire loss to fall upon the seller. Here again the spirit
of the article rather than its literal phraseology should rule. The
buyer should be compelled to pay for the two hundred bushels
he agreed to buy, and he should be entitled to whatever corn
is left. This is the conclusion reached in the case of alternative
sales.59 Another analogy might be drawn to the sale of specific
goods. It may be argued that the uncertainty of the goods sold
is remedied at the instant the first eight hundred bushels have
been destroyed. It may be argued that the remaining two hun-
dred bushels belong to the buyer.
59. Articles 2071, 2072, 2073, 2472, 2473, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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How Should the Weighing, Counting, or Measuring Be Done?
If the parties have agreed upon the method of weighing,
counting, or measuring in the contract of sale, the weighing,
counting, or measuring will have to be done in the manner pro-
vided in the contract in .order for title and risks to pass to the
buyer.6 0 If the contract is silent on the subject, the weighing,
counting, or measuring must be done contradictorily in order to
be effective'1 Of course, if one party or the other is in default,
it might well be that the other could at least ascertain the amount
of damages to which he will be entitled by weighing, counting, or
measuring the goods sold. The contradictory weighing, counting,
or measuring may be dispensed with in some cases as a result of
local custom or the custom of a trade or profession. Sometimes
it will suffice that the weighing is done by a public weigher.62
The weighing, counting, or measuring should ordinarily be done
at the place of delivery.63
The essentials of a valid weighing, counting, or measuring
have several times been considered by Louisiana courts in con-
nection with the sale of bales of cotton. Custom has played an
important part in the method by which these sales have been
conducted. Often the bales of cotton were sold by exhibiting
samples from each bale and the cotton sold at a price per pound.
The customary procedure was for the seller to simply give the
buyer an order directing the warehouseman to permit the buyer
to inspect the cotton and afterwards to weigh and deliver it on
the buyer's order. 4 The buyer was entitled to inspect the cotton
before the weighing and title passed only after the cotton had
been weighed by the warehouseman, who was considered the
seller's weigher. At the weighing, the buyer was entitled to be
represented by his own weigher. The French requirement of a
contradictory weighing was thereby satisfied and title passed at
the time of the weighing and delivery.
Lump Sales
In the case of a lump sale, it is clear that title and risks pass
immediately upon the consent of the parties.6 5 If A sells B all
60. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 20, at 22, § 349; 19 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 22, at 153, no 152; 10 Planiol et Ripert,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 334, no 301.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. See cases cited in note 41, supra.
65. Art. 2459, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, on the contrary, the goods, pro-
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the sugar in A's warehouse for one hundred and fifty dollars and
in the course of the transaction tells B that there were fifteen
hundred pounds in the warehouse, this would still be a lump sale.
However, the statement of quantity would give the buyer a right
to demand a supplement to the amount sold or a diminution of
the price if less than fifteen hundred pounds were found in the
warehouse.6 6 On the other hand, if an excess over and above the
fifteen hundred pounds is found to exist, there is no right of the
seller to demand a supplement of the price, since he agreed to
sell the whole for one hundred and fifty dollars. In effect, the
seller has assured the buyer that there will be at least fifteen
hundred pounds of sugar in the warehouse.6 7
COMMON LAW
At common law, the English decisions 68 as well as the early
American decisions held that title to the goods sold did not pass
until after the weighing, counting or measuring when an entire
mass of goods was sold by weight, count, or measure.6 9 This rule
was codified by the English Sales of Goods Act which fixed a
rebuttable presumption that title was intended to pass at the
time of the weighing, counting, or measuring.70 Later American
cases adopted the view that the courts should follow the inten-
tions of the parties exclusively without fixing a presumption one
way or the other.7 1  In line with the latter view the English rule
duce or other objects, have been sold in a lump, the sale is perfect, though
these objects may not have been weighed, counted or measured." Art. 1586,
French Civil Code; Smith v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 123 La. 959, 49 So. 655
(1909). See also Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870.
66. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 22, at 154-155, no
153; 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 22, at 156-157; 1 Troplong, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 104-105, no 92. Compare 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 58, at 1931
no 310.
67. 1 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 22, at 105, no 92: "As the seller, he
should know the extent of the thing . . . and if he is ignorant of it, this
Ignorance of his own act is not excusable."
68. Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East. 615, 102 Eng. Reprint 1425 (1805).
69. Deadwyler & Co. v. Karow & Forrer, 131 Ga. 227, 62 S.E. 172, 19
L.R.A.(N.S.) 197 (1908); Gibson v. Ray, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 444, 89 S.W. 474 (Ky.
App. 1905).
70. English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, § 18, rule 3:
"Unless a different intention appears; . . .
"Rule 3. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a
deliverable state, but the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test, or do some
other act or thing with reference to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining
the price, the property does not pass until such act or a thing be done, and
the buyer has notice thereof."
71. McDermott v. Kimball Lumber Co., 102 Ark. 344, 144 S.W. 524, 39
L,R.A.(N.S.) 461 (1912); Semple v. Northern Hardwood Lumber Co., 115 N.W.
899 (Iowa 1908); Gill v. Benjamin, 64 Wis. 362, 25 N.W. 445, 54 Am. Rep. 619
(1885).
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was purposely omitted from the Uniform Sales Act.7 2 The result
seems to be that the majority of American courts will be guided
by the facts and circumstances of the individual case, in deter-
mining when title passes.71
Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, it was gen-
erally settled in both England and America that there could be
no completed sale of a specific amount of goods to be taken from
a larger mass. Title would not pass until the goods to be sold
had been separated from the mass and put in a condition subject
to delivery. 74 An exception to this rule grew in America. If the
parties so intended, a sale could be consummated immediately if
the mass from which the quantity sold was to be taken was of a
homogeneous nature without a great variation in quality.7 5 In'
spite of a large number of decisions to the contrary,76 this ex-
ception became a part of the Uniform Sales Act.17 Section 6 (2)
provides for a case where there is a sale of a specific number,
weight, or measure of fungible goods in mass. In such cases, the
sale is complete upon the agreement of the parties. Some prob-
lems are likely to arise over fungibility. For example, are bales
of cotton that vary substantially in weight fungible? 78 The most
72. Commissioners' note (1931) 1 U.L.A. 149: "This rule of presumption is
artificial and has been discarded in New York and some other states." To
the same effect see 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 536, § 266; Vold,
Handbook of the Law of Sales (1931) 155-156.
73. See, for example, Gopcevic v. California Packing Corp., 64 Cal. App.
132, 220 Pac. 1078 (1923), where the terms of the contract were held to imply
that title to a prune crop did not pass until they had been weighed and the
price paid.
Circumstances such as payment of the price or a large part of it, allow-
ing the purchaser credit, or immediate delivery of the goods, serve as strong
evidence that title was intended to pass. 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at
539-543, § 269.
74. Notes (1910) 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 54; (1908) 9 Ann. Cas. 26; 1 Williston, op.
cit. supra note 55, at 278-280.
75. Chapman v. Shepherd, 39 Conn. 413 (1872); Kingman v. Holmquist, 36
Kan. 735, 14 Pac. 168 (1887); Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N.Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec.
334 (1859); O'Keefe v. Leistikow, 14 N.D. 355, 104 N.W. 515, 9 Ann. Cas. 25
(1905). Compare the early case of Pleasants v. Pendleton, 27 Va. 473, 18 Am.
Dec. 726 (1828), where a sale of 119 barrels of flour to be taken from 123
barrels of flour was held to pass title. See also Notes (1908) 9 Ann. Cas. 29;
(1910) 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 57; 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 280-282, §§
150-152.
76. Fleming v. State, 106 Ga. 359, 32 S.E. 338 (1899); Mellinger v. Hunt,
94 Iowa 351, 62 N.W. (1895); Woods v. McGee, 7 Ohio 127, 30 Am. Dec. 202
(1836). See Carpenter v. Glass, 67 Ark. 135, 53 S.W. 678 (1899).
77. The present stage of the law on such sales at -common law is treated
in Woodward, Cases on the Law of Sales (3 ed. 1933) 161-176.
78. Bales of cotton were held to be fungible in In re Heyward-Williams
Co., 284 Fed. 983(S.D. Ga., 1923), noted in (1923) 11 Calif. L. Rev. 290. A con-
trary result was reached in Interstate Banking & Trust Co. v. Brown, 235
Fed. 32, 148 C.C.A. 526 (1916). Section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act defines
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logical suggestion on this point seems to be that the courts should
look to the intentions of the parties in an effort to see whether
they regarded the goods as fungible. 7
Although risks are usually governed by the intentions of
the parties at common law, in the absence of an express or clearly
implied agreement to the contrary, the courts will presume that
risks pass at the same time title passes.80 The result is that the
rule res perit domino is usually applicable. Naturally, however,
if the party in possession is at fault, the risk of loss would be on
him.8" However, in many cases, the parties may find it con-
venient for the seller to assume the risk until the buyer has
actually received the goods or in conditional sales until the price
*is paid.2
RUSSELL B. LONG
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A RATIFICATION OF AN
AGENT'S UNAUTHORiZED CONTRACT?
A wide diversity of opinion exists among the various Ameri-
can jurisdictions as to the effect of the ratification of an agent's
unauthorized contract. In order to present the questions in-
volved, the following hypothetical case is presented. On the first
day of the month, A, agent acting on behalf of P, purchased five
hundred bales of cotton from T at seventeen cents a pound. On
the second P discovered that A had made this purchase. On the
fourteenth, the day before delivery was to be made, P wired a
ratification of the purchase to T. During the period between the
original purchase and ratification the price of cotton had risen
to twenty cents a pound. When T received the wire of ratifica-
tion he immediately wired P that since A did not have authority
fungible goods as those "of which any unit is from its nature or mercantile
usage treated as the equivalent of any other unit."
Query: Should the "fungible goods" qualification be implied in sales of
goods by weight, count, or measure at civil law? The point would not be
important in regard to passage of title and risks, since they pass only after
the weighing, counting, or measuring. However, the point could have some
effect as to the necessity of a contradictory weighing, counting, or measur-
ing.
79. Vold, op. cit. supra note 72, at 186-187.
80. Uniform Sales Act, § 22; Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 693-694,
§ 301.
81. Compare Section 22(b) of the Uniform Sales Act with Article 1915 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. The risk of loss will be upon the party in
default.
82. Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 694 et seq., §§ 302 et seq.
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